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Abstract
James Mirrlees (1971) launched the second wave of optimal tax models by suggesting a way to formalize the
planner’s problem that deals explicitly with unobserved heterogeneity among taxpayers.So, in this paper opti-
mal income taxation theories are subject of investigation following the classic paper in public finance by Mirrlees
(1971). This provides analytical solutions for the second-best efficient tax system in presence of such an
adverse selection. Until late 1990s, Mirrlees results were not closely connected to empirical tax studies and had
little impact on tax policy recommendations. Next, the famous result Diamond-Mirrlees efficiency theorem
Diamond-Mirrlees (1971a), Diamond-Mirrlees (1971b),has been reviewed. This theorem is important because
it states that there should be no taxes on intermediate goods, and that private and public production should be
based on same prices. Also, taxation should not violate efficiency of production. Solution to the Mankiw prob-
lem on the other hand states that small open economy, labor bears 100% of small capital income tax.
The availability of the eight documents does not indicate outright budget process transparency nor do we sug-
gest that in means absolute accountability of the authorities however it demonstrates a step towards increased
citizens informed and active civic participation.
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INTRODUCTION 
The subject of the optimal design of tax system has been topic that has long fascinated economic theorist.
This paper explores some theories that policy makers must consider when designing optimal tax systems.
Mainly the material in this paper draws material from the very important paper ,actually the foundation of
modern tax theory by Mirrlees (1971). Some lessons from the optimal tax theory are presented in this paper
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also namely: Optimal tax schedule depends on the shape of the distribution of the ability, the optimal mar-
ginal income tax schedule could incline at high incomes, a flat tax with a universal lump-sum transfer could
be optimal, the extent of redistribution rises with wage inequality, taxes should depend on the ability (some
personal characteristics such as IQ and the working hours),only final goods to be taxed (no taxes on inter-
mediate goods), capital income ought to be untaxed, also Mankiw problem shows that that in a small open
economy, labor bears 100% of small capital income tax. This paper is divided in following sections: at first it
starts with the literature review, followed by the explanation of the Mirrlees (1971) model ,which is better
understood under Saez (2001). This section is briefly followed by the Daimond-Mirrlees theorem Diamond-
Mirrlees (1971a), Diamond-Mirrlees (1971b). This section is followed by the Mankiw problem and its solu-
tion. Mankiw problem was posted online by Nicholas Gregory Mankiw, on his blog.1 Later paper finishes by
the conclusions part. 
Literature review
The central element of the theory of optimal taxation is information. Public policies apply to the individuals
based on what the government knows about them. Second welfare theorem states, that where several con-
vexity and continuity assumptions are satisfied, an optimum is a competitive equilibrium once initial endow-
ments have been suitably distributed. Mirrlees (1986), elaborates that a good way of governing is to agree
upon objectives, then to discover what is possible and to optimize. In general, complete information about
the consumers for the transfers is required to make the distribution requires, so the question of feasible lump-
sum transfers arises here. Usually the optimal tax systems combine flat marginal tax rate plus lump sum
grants to all the individuals(so that the average tax rate rises with income even if the marginal does not),
Mankiw NG, Weinzierl M, Yagan D.(2009).2 The choice of the optimal redistributive tax involves tradeoffs
between three kinds of effects : equity effect (it changes the distribution of income), the efficiency effect form
reducing the incentives, the insurance effect from reducing the variance of individual income streams,
Varian,H.R.(1980). Diamond, Helms and Mirrlees (1978),analyze the presence of uncertainty in the analysis
of optimal taxation, with Cobb-Douglas utility function, with elasticity of substitution between labor and leisure
<1 s that backward bending labor supply curve can be observed. Two period model with uncertainty showed
how stochastic economies differ from the economies without uncertainty, since these second-best insur-
ance/redistribution programs differ in the outcomes from the first best result economies without government
intervention. In general, Varian (1980) finds for linear and non-linear optimal tax, that if the consumption val-
ues are bounded, the optimal tax will always exist and would be a continuous function of observed income.
In early contribution Ramsey (1927) , supposed that the planner must raise tax revenue only through impo-
sition of tax on commodities only. In his model taxes should be imposed in inverse proportion to the repre-
sentative customer’s elasticity of demand for the good, so that commodities with more inelastic demand are
taxed more heavily. Governments in real world however cannot observe individual ability. Mirrlees (1971) ,
in the basic version of the model allowed individuals to differ in their innate ability. The planer can observe
income, but the planner cannot observe ability or effort. By recognizing unobserved heterogeneity, diminish-
ing marginal utility of consumption, and incentive effects, the Mirrlees approach formalizes the classical
tradeoff between efficiency and equity. In this framework the optimal tax problem is a problem of imperfect
information between taxpayers and the social planner. Saez (2001) argued that “unbounded distributions are
of much more interest than bounded distributions to address high income optimal tax rate problem”. In all the
cases that Saez (2001) investigated (four cases)3 the optimal tax rates are clearly U-shaped. This paper by
using the elasticity estimates from the literature, the formula for the asymptotic top rates suggests that the
marginal rates for the labor income should not be lower than 50% and they could be as much as high as
80%.Diamond and Mirrlees (1971a) and Diamond, Mirrlees (1971b), are proposing alternative in Ramsey
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1) http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2017/10/an-exercise-for-my-readers.html 
2) A key determinant of the optimal tax schedule (tax bracket) is the shape of the ability of the distribution.
3) Utilitarian criterion, utility type I and II and Rawlsian criterion, utility type I and II. 
proposition by allowing the social planer to considers a numerous tax systems. In the first paper Diamond
and Mirrlees (1971a), they prove how some market imperfections eg. capital market imperfections (con-
sumers can lend but not borrow), the market situation will alter the optimal tax structure. Diamond and
Mirrlees (1971b), are proposing tax rules for single good economy (changes on demand due to the tax struc-
ture differ from proportionality with larger than average percentage fall in the demand for goods with large
income derivatives (elasticities) ,in three-good economy the tax rate is proportionately greater for a good with
smaller cross elasticity of compensated demand with the price of labor, in many commodities economy,
households with low social marginal income utility predominate among the purchasers of the commodity, that
commodity should be taxed more heavily, and vice versa, this taxation increases total welfare. Diamond and
Mirrlees (1971a), continue to point out that there should not be taxation on intermediate goods such as cap-
ital held by the producers, also see Judd (1999). The general result Judd (1999) finds is that optimal tax on
capital should be zero except for the initial period. Judd (1985), also found a zero optimal long-run capital
income tax rate for steady states of the general competitive equilibrium and heterogeneous infinitely-lived
agents with non-separable preferences. But the famous Atkinson,Stiglitz (1976) results(result on the role of
indirect taxation with an optimal nonlinear income tax) states that commodity taxes are not useful under
these assumptions about the utility function: weak separability of function, and homogeneity across individ-
uals in sub-utility of consumption. The Atkinson-Stiglitz result is obtained by embedding the Ramsey model
within Mirrlees model. Also zero-top tax rate suggest important task for the policy makers to identify the
shape of the high-end of the ability distribution (they cannot observe the effort and ability in direct way but
they can observe income). Tuomala (1990), confirms that marginal tax rate decreases as income increases
except at income levels within a bottom decile. Ordover, J., Phelps,E. (1979), provided that if consumption
have weakly separable utility functions and government has instruments that allow it to fix the capital stock
on the socially optimal level, then the optimal tax rate on capital is zero, Salanie (2003). Chamley (1986),
results on zero capital income tax states: “When the consumption decisions in a given period have only a
negligible effect on the structure of preferences for periods in the distant future, then the second-best tax rate
on capital income tends to zero in the long run”. But these are (Ramsey capital income tax )two period mod-
els if more periods are included than the optimal tax formula would be more complex, as in Auerbach,
Kotlikoff (1987a), and Auerbach, Kotlikoff (1987b). Feldstein (1978), showed that elimination of tax on capi-
tal income is only optimal only when the structure of preferences satisfy certain separability condition. And
for the capital taxation to be optimal it must be that uncompensated elasticity of savings (elasticity of the
Marshalian demand for savings) is zero, even when the compensated elasticity of consumption of old pop-
ulation (Hicksian demand for consumption) is high (he reported result of -0.75). Now, if the labor and con-
sumption are equivalent for the individuals, but savings pattern are different, results is that individuals will
save more with consumption tax, than with labor tax. In OLG closed economy capital stock is due to life-time
savings. The full neutrality result implies extra savings of young is equal to the consumption of old capital
stock plus new government deficit (no change in capital stock).4 In equilibrium where endowment is zero at
equilibrium, and Hicksian demand for consumption is infinite i.e. compensated elasticity of consumption
when old is infinite. But according to Saez, Stantcheva (2016a), because individuals derive utility from
wealth, micro foundations for this wealth in the utility function are: bequest motives, entrepreneurship, or
services from wealth it means that steady-state features finite finite supply elasticities of capital to capital tax
rates. And because there is bi-heterogeneity of the agent’s income and capital, Atkinson-Stiglitz zero-tax
result does not apply herein. The optimal tax rate on inheritance (bequest in utility) case is zero, when the
elasticity of bequest is infinite nesting the zero tax result. However, when in the model are imputed bequests,
inequality is bi-dimensional and earnings are no longer the unique determinant of lifetime resources. That
means that here A-S zero-tax result fails, see Piketty, T. , Saez,E., (2013), Farhi and Werning (2010).Also,
Stiglitz, J.(1982) , showed that when leisure and goods are separable, differential taxation of commodities
cannot be used as a basis of separation between the two and therefore is sub-optimal, Saez (2002).
Commodity taxation is desirable when government is using social weights that are correlated with the con-
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4) Aggregate interest rate should equal to interest rate for the government debt. 
sumption patterns and are conditional on income, or when the consumption patterns are related to the intrin-
sic earning ability and leisure choices . Saez, E. ,S. Stantcheva (2016b),define social marginal welfare weight
as a function of agents consumption, earnings, and a set of characteristics that affect social marginal wel-
fare weight and a set of characteristics that affect utility. Chari and Kehoe (1999), besides developing
stronger zero-optimal capital income tax rate than Chamley (1986), are developing Barro’s (1979) result on
tax smoothing, where in deterministic concept, optimal tax rates are constant, while in stochastic economy
with incomplete markets tax rates follow a random pattern generated by a martingale process . Auerbach, A.
(2009), Kaplow(1994), propose equivalence of consumption taxes and labor taxes: a linear consumption at
some inclusive rate, is equivalent to a labor tax income combined with the initial wealth. In this setting con-
sumption tax is equal to labor tax if there is no initial wealth and differences in wealth arise only from wealth
preferences. 
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5) And if in the presence of optimal income taxation whether if a small commodity tax can be replicated by a small income change,
and when this is not a case commodity taxation allows government to expand its own taxation power and therefore it is desir-
able. 
6) Martingale is a sequence of random variables (i.e., a stochastic process) for which, at a particular time, the conditional expecta-
tion of the next value in the sequence, given all prior values, is equal to the present value.
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Conclusion 
This paper made attempt to review the past and the current literature on the optimal tax theory, empirical and
theoretical. The developments of the tax theory are improving the tax policies around the world. One of the
most important improvements is the worldwide trend towards reduction of taxation of capital income. Also,
the worldwide tendency toward flatter income tax rates. The motivation of the original Mirrlees (1971) paper
was to provide a framework for which to derive an optimal structure of tax rates, which turned out to be flat
for a broad range. Or as Mirrlees said :“I must confess that I had expected the rigorous analysis of income-
taxation in the utilitarian manner to provide an argument for high tax rates,” Professor Mirrlees wrote. “It has
not done so.” He was surprised by his conservative conclusions. Those conclusions are: Linear tax sched-
ule is desirable, except supply of highly educated labor is much more inelastic from the utility function, and
especially negative income tax is recommended for the workers that earn lower than some level, Income tax-
ation is of no use when battling inequality, Some complementary taxes for  the income tax will be of use
here…such as taxes that depend on the time spent at work and workers ability and the income from such
labor. The problem lies here as prof.Mirrlees wrote:” but if it is true, as our results suggest, that the income
tax is not a very satisfactory alternative, this objection must be weighed against the great desirability of find-
ing some effective method of offsetting the unmerited favors that some of us receive from our genes and
family advantages”. This is contradictory to the requirement of the optimal tax,i.e. that optimal tax must not
have effect on the wealth of the society where it has being levied. The sum of mechanical effect, welfare
effect, and behavioral effect should equal to zero. 
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